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ABSTRACT
The premier’s annual press conferences are an interpreter-
mediated and institutionalised event, which enables the Chinese
government to articulate its official discourse on a variety of
topics in front of a domestic and international audience. Framing
the conferences as part of an autopoietic system, following
Luhmann, helps to shed light on the imperative for such systems
to legitimate themselves for their autonomous and continued
existence through discourse. This is achieved, in part, through
self-reference. Drawing on a corpus-based study informed by
Critical Discourse Analysis, we explore the government-affiliated
interpreters’ mediation of Beijing’s discourse on different levels
using self-referential terms. The interpreters are found to
frequently add self-referential terms (e.g. we, our, government,
China) in English overall. They are also observed employing the
broader WE (e.g. we, our, us) proportionally at the expense of
the premier’s personal voice I and that of the GOVERNMENT and
CHINA. The interpreters’ institutional positioning and identity as
part of the government is therefore confirmed through their
explicit discursive interventions, which help convey what Searle
terms ‘collective intentionality’ and contribute to the legitimacy
of the government. The discursive effects of these are discussed
using bilingual examples.
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The Premier-Meets-the-Press conferences are an interpreter-mediated televised event held
annually in the Chinese capital Beijing. Facilitated by consecutive interpreting, this discur-
sive event enables Beijing to articulate its version of the ‘Chinese story’ in front of the
global audience in the international lingua franca, that is, English. The government
interpreters are usually communist party members and are recruited into China’s Ministry
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of Foreign Affairs as part of China’s ruling elite. The ideological nature of this interpreted
institutional event highlights the potential mediation role of the interpreter in aligning
with Beijing’s discourse, (re)constructing a certain image and contributing to the govern-
ment’s legitimacy as an institution.
The ability for an autonomous and self-regulating institution to maintain and repro-
duce itself is crucial. According to Luhmann (1990, p. 19), every (political) system is con-
fronted with the need to form a unique identity and the ‘imperative to legitimate itself’. It
is through self-referencing that an autonomous, or autopoietic, system recursively ‘pro-
duces and reproduces the elements’ central to itself (ibid., pp. 39–40). It can be argued
that, to varying degrees, all systems, institutions, and organisations thrive on self-reference
for their autonomous and continued existence (e.g. in the form of institutional rules and
policies). That is, although the repeated (re)production of self-references might be ‘logi-
cally circular and therefore empty’ (Luhmann, 1990, p. 41), self-reference constitutes a
vital ‘modus operandi of the system’ (Lambropoulou, 1995, p. 694) nonetheless. In a
context of international relations and globalisation, system legitimation is shaped by
myriad external influences that inevitably entail multilingual engagement. As Koskinen
(2014:, p. 480) observes, governments operating in multilingual contexts ‘unavoidably
[need] to develop a relationship to translation’. Self-referentiality and the translation
regime in which it operates are therefore worthy of particular scholarly attention.
As part of a series of studies exploring the government interpreters’ agency and discur-
sive mediation from different perspectives (Gu, 2018, 2019a, 2019b, 2019c) at the premier’s
press conferences, this corpus-based CDA study examines the interpreters’ mediation of
the premier’s discourse through self-referential items. From an interpreting perspective,
‘self-referentiality’ is important on at least two major counts. Firstly, it is central to the
investigation of the interpreters’ identity and institutional alignment enacted in their inter-
preting product. The first-person plural pronoun ‘we’ and its various related forms (our,
ours, us, ourselves), for example, have long been considered as salient markers of group
membership and institutional alignment in Critical Discourse Analysis and beyond. This
includes ‘in-group’ identity (Van Dijk, 1984), ‘institutional identity’ (Sacks, 1992) and
footing (Goffman, 1981). Apart from only indicating issues of institutional alignment
and identity, as Beaton (2007, p. 277) argues in her study investigating metaphor strings
in the EU, self-referentiality can serve to strengthen the process of ‘ideological stabilisation’
within a particular institution. As such, the way in which self-referential items are rendered
by the interpreters concerns, for instance, how a government’s institutional presence, ideol-
ogy and voice might be sustained, weakened or strengthened and, as a result, how this
might effect change to the institution’s hegemony in a different language.
Despite the fact that the interpreters’ use of institutional self-referential terms may be
highly salient in illuminating their degree of agency and ideological mediation, it has
seldom been explored in interpreting studies (IS). However, as part of a growing trend
of product-oriented research, scholars in interpreting studies have increasingly explored
interpreters’ active agency and (ideological) mediation in various political and insti-
tutional settings (e.g. Beaton-Thome, 2013; Diriker, 2004; Mason, 1999; Wadensjö,
1998; Wang & Feng, 2018), drawing, for example, on critical discourse analysis, conversa-
tion analysis, participation framework and SFL. This line of research has focused attention
on such categories as modality (Li, 2018), ideologically salient lexical items and lexical lab-
elling (Beaton-Thome, 2013), ‘critical points’ (Wang & Feng, 2018), present perfect
2 C. GU AND R. TIPTON
constructions (Gu, 2018), the enactment of positive self versus negative other (Gu, 2019a;
2019b) and the mediation of people-related items (Gu, 2019c) in interpreting. While some
studies have explored issues of footing in consecutive interpreting in the Chinese setting
(e.g. Sun, 2012), issues of self-referentiality focusing on EU interpreters in the simul-
taneous mode (e.g. Beaton-Thome, 2010) and the interpreters’ alignment when positioned
between different sides with different ideological beliefs at political press conferences (Gu,
2019b), these have largely involved qualitative analysis of a relatively small amount of data.
No study has systematically investigated the interpreters’ self-referentiality and insti-
tutional identity on a large corpus and explored the discursive effect of the interpreters’
image (re)construction and potential role in contributing to the institution’s hegemony
discursively and rhetorically in another language. This makes the topic of the interpreters’
mediation of self-referentiality a productive focus for research.
Preliminary analysis of the premier’s press conference data finds that ‘self-referentiality’
is a highly pronounced feature and relevant concept in both Chinese and English. Unsur-
prisingly, given the one-to-many nature of the discursive event, self-references are con-
stantly used by the Chinese premier in answering the journalists’ questions and
addressing the general public. This is evidenced by the fact that self-referential terms
such as ‘we’, ‘China’, ‘our’ are amongst the most frequent lexical items in the corpus
(see Figure 1). Over the past few decades, the Chinese government, led by the Communist
party, has played a central role in China’s diplomacy, policies and decision-making. Con-
sidering the current one-party system in mainland China, the government, the Commu-
nist Party, and China as well as the first-person plural ‘we’1 can all be deemed synonymous
and interchangeable in nature and central to the idea of self-referentiality.
This is why the interpreters’ mediation of the Chinese premiers’ discourse through the
category of self-referentiality constitutes an interesting area of investigation. Specifically,
we aim to address the following questions:
Figure 1. Screenshot of the Word List in English
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(1) How and to what extent might the government interpreters (re)construct the Chinese
premiers’ political discourse between Chinese and English through mediating self-
referentiality at different levels?
(2) Through mediating self-referential items, how might the interpreters serve to
strengthen, stabilise or weaken the premiers’ discourse and what image might the
interpreters help (re)construct from the perspective of discursive effect?
Self-referentiality, institutional legitimacy and interpreter-mediated press
conferences
All social systems, for Luhmann (1990, p. 19), are confronted with the need to form a
unique identity and with the ‘imperative to legitimate’ themselves. It is through self-refer-
encing that autonomous or ‘autopoietic’ systems (e.g. institutions and organisations)
recursively produce and reproduce elements essential to themselves to continue their
existence (e.g. in the form of organisational rules, regulations and policies) (ibid.: 39–
40). The concept of autopoiesis or ‘self-making’ derives from Maturana and Varela’s
(e.g.1980) work in neuroscience on the regenerating biological cell; it has been increasingly
incorporated and adapted by the social and political sciences in the study of social systems,
with Luhmann being a prominent exponent. He argues that social systems are reproduced
through ‘communications’. In critiquing this emphasis on communications, Eldridge
(2002, p. 302) argues that Luhmann’s theory ‘abstracts social processes to the point that
individuals, groups and organizations are largely outside the theory’s purview’ and
makes the case for humans to have the potential to create autopoietic patterns in their
social relations, thereby promoting a behavioural as opposed to communications
approach. This line of argument has resonance with the goals of our investigation. The
interpreter-mediated press conferences can be viewed as an autopoietic and performative
discourse system at an institutional level (see Kidwell, 2009). Operationally, the press con-
ferences constitute a closed system (they have their own institutional rules and pro-
cedures) that maintain the broader (political) system as a unified entity; however, they
can also be described as structurally open due to the presence of domestic and global
media outlets and the Chinese premier’s dynamic interactions with the interpreters and
journalists.
This interaction, however, is fundamentally based on the maintenance of the system
and the consolidation of the government’s own institutional identity. That is, the inter-
national media (‘the environment’ in Luhmann’s terminology) can question but it does
not necessarily lead the ‘system’ to respond, since the system is concerned only with its
own survival. At the press conferences, the interpreters can exert control over the insti-
tutional repertoires, regulate the production of political messages to the international
media, and discursively re-construct China’s political image in a manner that both
echoes the national discursive performance by restating the government as a legitimate
political actor (through reproduction of and alignment with the source discourse), and
boosting its image by restating and, in some cases, strengthening its discursive and rhetori-
cal acts. The process of interpreting, however, is intimately bound up with the ideological
influences on the performative space, which are themselves derived from the political and
institutional spheres. Identifying interpreter behaviour therefore requires a critical
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approach to the complex discursive performances. Given the political and ideological
nature of the discursive event and in order to answer the research questions relating to
how interpreters might mediate China’s political discourse through using self-referential
terms, CDA has been selected as the principal framework in the analysis that follows.
Theoretical framework, corpus data and methodology
Viewing discourse as a form of social practice, CDA is concerned with exposing and
making more explicit the otherwise hidden ideologies and latent power asymmetries
enacted, legitimised and reproduced in discourse. For CDA practitioners, discourse is
both socially shaped and socially constitutive, and has the ability to shape reality and
effect change. While there are various schools and traditions, including Fairclough’s
(1989) Three-dimensional model, van Dijk’s (2008) Sociocognitive approach, and Ruth
Wodak’s (2001) Discourse-Historical Approach, all CDA approaches are united by a
shared critical attitude and aim to shed light on the often opaque power and ideology
enacted in language use.
To date, CDA has mostly been applied to monolingual texts (e.g. newspapers and pol-
itical manifestos). Given the mediated nature of the premier’s press conferences, interpret-
ing is conceptualised as a (re)contextualisation process at a macro level, with the
interpreter serving as the vital intertextual and interlingual connecting point between
the source text (Chinese) and the target text (English). The fact that information is inevi-
tably rendered into the sociopolitical, cultural and linguistic contexts of the TT highlights
the micro-level decision-making, stance-taking and potentially ideological mediation that
occur in the interpreting process. Such a macro-level conceptualisation permits a critical
comparative analysis between the Chinese ST and English TT, focusing on ideologically
salient shifts.
Critiques of CDA (e.g. Widdowson, 1995) and its frequent recourse to qualitative
manual analysis raise important questions of representativeness, objectiveness and validity
of the findings. Methods of corpus linguistics (CL) have thus been increasingly incorpor-
ated (Baker, 2012; Mautner, 2009) as a ‘useful methodological synergy’ (Baker et al., 2008)
in order to reduce researcher bias and lead to more systematic and objective research. This
study employs a mixed-methods approach of corpus-based CDA, thus triangulating
between the typically qualitative (CDA) and typically quantitative (CL). More detailed dis-
cussions on the corpus-based CDA approach can be found in Gu (2018; 2019c).
This corpus-based CDA analysis draws on the CE-PolitDisCorp (Chinese-English Pol-
itical Discourses Corpus) established by the first author for investigating the various
aspects of China’s political interpreting and discourses in Chinese and English. It consists
of 20 years of China’s Premier-Meets-the-Press conference data (1998–2017). The bilin-
gual corpus contains 310,924 tokens in total (170,260 tokens in Chinese and 140,664
tokens in English). A more detailed breakdown of the corpus data is presented in Table
1. On average, one press conference lasts for approximately 2 hours. Since there is one
press conference each year, there are, in total, 20 press conferences in the CE-PolitDis-
Corp, spanning over three latest administrations so far: Jiang-Zhu (1998–2002), Hu-
Wen (2003–2012) and Xi-Li (2013–2017). The scope of the corpus data makes it possible
to identify consistent and relatively stable patternings over time. Since the main body of
the data involves (1) the Chinese premier’s utterances in Chinese (subcorpus A) and
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(2) their corresponding interpretations into English (subcorpus B), these two components
form the focus of this study.
The corpus data was transcribed verbatim from videos available on China’s official web-
sites as well as on video-sharing sites such as YouTube and Youku. The fully prepared data
(e.g. after segmentation for Chinese) is analysed using the AntConc software (3.4.4
windows). This specific software contains various functions including concordancing,
wordlist generation (lexical frequency), keyword generation, Kwic sorting and tools for
studying clusters/N-grams.
Data analysis operates at different levels. Regarding the more detailed procedures, first-
person plural pronoun ‘we’ (and its related forms) and other frequently occurring self-
referential terms (e.g. ‘China’ and ‘government’) are first identified in subcorpus A
(Chinese discourse) and subcorpus B (interpreted English discourse) using AntConc’s
Word List tool. The identified self-referential items might be placed into different sub-
groups for ease of further analysis (e.g. such items as we, our*, us can be seen as represent-
ing a broader group of WE and China/Chinese can be seen as belonging to a broader cat-
egory of CHINA).
Having established the self-referential items in both subcorpora, the absolute frequencies
of identified items are counted individually and then added up in each subcorpus. This
allows the overall occurrences of self-referentiality in both subcorpora to be compared on
a global level. If the interpreters are found to over-articulate self-referential terms in the
English TT, this may constitute an example of repetition (Fairclough, 1989) as a result of
interpreting. It should be assumed that the more times the various self-referential items
are mentioned by the interpreters the stronger the institutional ideology in English and
the stronger the interpreters’ alignmentwith their institutional employer. From the perspec-
tive of image, this can (re)create a strong overall image of the government being present and
in control. If the contrary is found, there would be a lack of interpreter alignment. That is,
the ideological discourse in Chinese is diluted and the government is rendered less promi-
nent as an actor in English. In addition to this macro-level comparison, the data is also
explored from a relational and diachronic perspective. Wherever relevant, detailed
examples ofmanualCDAanalyses are also provided to illustrate the interpreters’mediation.
Data analysis: interpreters’ institutional alignment and strengthening of
government’s ideological discourse through self-referentiality
Overall level of self-referentiality between the ST and TT
To examine how self-referentiality is rendered by the interpreters, self-referential items
were established in both subcorpus A (Chinese) and subcorpus B (English) using
Table 1. Breakdown of the various subcorpora of the CE-PolitDisCorp.
CE-PolitDisCorp (1998-2017)






China’s official discourses in Chinese
and English (sum of sub-corpus A
and B)
Journalists’ questions and their
respective interpretations
127,696 tokens 105,495 tokens 233,191 tokens 77,733 tokens
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AntConc’s Wordlist function and then counted. Self-referential items here are understood
to include direct mentions of both China, the ruling party, the Chinese government and
key institutions established by the government. Notably, a short phrase might contain
more than one self-referential item (e.g. 我们中央政府; literally ‘our central govern-
ment’). In such relatively rare cases, even though they appear in one short phrase, they
were counted separately for the simple reason that our, central and government are all con-
stitutive elements contributing to the idea of self-referentiality. In other words, discur-
sively and ideologically, saying ‘our central government’ (emphasising the presence of
‘we’ and the ‘central’ position of the government at the heart of China’s policies and
decisions) is far from the same as just using the seemingly plain ‘the government’ or ‘we’.
Furthermore, the one-to-many nature of the press conferences means that, compara-
tively speaking, the use of we is stable and homogeneous, referring predominantly to
the Chinese government/China represented by the Communist Party. Arguably, even in
the few cases involving the anaphoric use of we (e.g. referring to the Chinese and
Indian governments), the interpreters are still aligning (partially) with China and the
Chinese government they work for. As such, it is unnecessary to further distinguish
what we refers to in this particular setting.2
In limited cases where items (e.g. government) in the corpus might refer to a foreign
government (e.g. the Japanese or Indian government), the item (e.g. government) was
searched in the respective subcorpus to generate concordance lines. The concordance
lines were then re-arranged using the Kwic Sort function (three words to the left or
right of the item). The instances that are not self-references of China/the Chinese govern-
ment can be easily identified and discounted.
The self-referential items identified from the Chinese and English subcorpora are pre-
sented in Table 2 (the items in Chinese and English presented in the same line are rough
equivalents and a space is left where there are no direct equivalents). There are 3049
instances of the identified self-referential items in subcorpus A, whereas there are
5679 mentions of the identified items in subcorpus B. That is, the frequency of self-
referential items in English is almost double of that in Chinese (a significant 86.3%
increase due to interpreting). If a similar level of institutional self-referentiality indicates
a general degree of interpreter alignment and maintenance of the government’s presence
in the TT, then a marked 86.3% increase constitutes the interpreters’ strong alignment
and strengthening of the government’s institutional hegemony. Discursively, the
interpreters’ increased (re)production of self-referentiality conveys an image that the
government is the chief agent actively involved in different aspects of China’s day-to-
day operation.
More specifically, the top three self-referential items in the Chinese subcorpus are我们
(literally we, 44.6%),中国 (literally China, 26.8%) and政府 (literally government, 12.1%),
together accounting for 83.5% of all self-references identified. Similarly, the top three self-
referential items in the English subcorpus are the first-person plural WE, that is, we and its
related forms (52.6%), CHINA, that is, China and Chinese (24.8%) and GOVERNMENT,
that is, government(s) (10.5%), constituting 87.9% of all identified self-references3 in sub-
corpus B. Apart from their mediation of self-referentiality overall, the interpreters’
increased alignment is also evidenced pronouncedly in their mediation of the top three
self-referential items across languages (a marked increase of 119.8%, 72.5% and 61.5%
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respectively). Given the prominence of WE (we, our*, us), CHINA (China/Chinese) and
GOVERNMENT, they will form the focus of discussions here.
The interpreters’ frequent use of these self-referential items is revealing discursively.
The first-person plural pronouns (we, us, our*), for example, are indicative of the
interpreters’ positioning and in-group identity (Van Dijk, 1984). Also, the interpreters’
proliferated use of Chin* and government(s) clearly delineates the geographic context of
China and specifies that the Chinese government is the chief social actor behind
China’s policies and actions. Example 1 illustrates the interpreter’s increased alignment
at a micro level through the vigorous (re)production of various self-referential items in







Gloss: So the government is determined to push ahead with the national portability of
medical insurance. This year will, on the basis that direct settlement of expenses at a pro-
vincial level can basically be resolved, strive to use two years’ time to[…]make reasonable
and legitimate out-of-town payment issue no longer a point of pain for the masses. Of
course, this requires all of our relevant departments to make great efforts. The purpose
of our administration is for what? The departure point still is to improve people’s liveli-
hood, that is, to let the masses’ demand for well-being reversely drive our development,
push and test our reform.
Table 2. Identified self-referential items in both subcorpora.
Self-referential item in ST Frequency in ST Self-referential item in TT Frequency in TT
我们 1360 Various forms of the
first-person plural ‘we’
2989
(we 2103; us 133; our* 753)
中国 818 Chin* 1411
(China 1076/Chinese 335)
政府 369 government(s) 596
国家 136 (the/this) country 256
中央 93 central 127
全国 49
党 48 (the) party 28
国务院 35 State Council 41
中央政府 31 central government 70
两会 26 NPC and CPPCC sessions/two sessions 26
祖国 22 motherland 12
人大 14 NPC 21
党中央 12 Central Committee 26
人民代表大会 11 National People’s Congress 29 8
我国 9 Our country 24
中华 (China or Chinese with




(abbreviated form of ‘the
Chinese Communist Party’)
3 CPC (abbreviated form of
‘Communist Party of China’)
21
共产党 2 Communist Party (of China) 9
政协 2 CPPCC 14
Total 3,049 Total 5,679
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TT: So the Chinese government is fully determined to achieve national portability of
medical insurance schemes at a faster pace. This year we will basically achieve the direct
settlement of such expenses at the provincial level. And we also plan to use two years of
time to[…]remove this high concern on the minds of our people. And this requires that all
relevant government departments to make tremendous efforts. All the government’s
work is to improve the well-being of our people. So we need to use the concrete wishes
for a better life by our people to drive our development, and reform and test the results
of our reform.
In this example extracted from the 2016 conference, the overall message has been rela-
tively accurately rendered. However, there are a number of salient signs indicative of the
interpreter’s institutional alignment. In terms of self-referentiality, a considerably stronger
presence of the Chinese government can be found in the TT vis-à-vis the ST. As marked in
bold, while there are 5 instances of self-references in the ST (government, our, our, our and
our), 12 instances were identified in the English TT (more than twice the number in ST).
Notably, none of the additions was triggered by the ST or the grammatical differences
between the two languages.
More specifically, self-referential items such as Chinese and government have been
added to specify that it is the ‘Chinese’ government that is determined and all relevant
‘government’ departments are to make tremendous efforts. In addition, a very noticeable
collocational pattern ‘our people’ can be detected in the TT. That is,群众 (the masses),民
生 (people’s livelihood) and群众 (the masses) have all been rendered into English as ‘our
people’ with the addition our (three instances in this short extract alone). Discursively, the
interpreter’s repeated use of ‘our people’ indicates a relationship of ‘belonging’, re-confi-
rming the reality that the people are under the leadership of the Chinese government and
the Communist party (of which the interpreter is a core member). Cumulatively, such
active engagement (re)creates a positive image of the government being committed to
serving the people over the 20 years’ data.
This trend is also visible in the following examples. The pervasive additions of self-
referential items (e.g. we, our, government, central, China) in the English discourse
have shown the interpreters’ institutional alignment, which have (re)constructed a more
favourable image of the government being competent and actively involved in various




Gloss: We’ll take the transformation of economic growth pattern as the main focus to
really make China’s economy shift towards one that mostly relies on technological pro-
gress and improvement of labour force quality, emphasising on raising the quality and
efficiency of economic growth.
TT: We’ll take the transformation of China’s economic development pattern as our pri-
ority task so that we will be able to refocus China’s economic development to scientific and
technological advances and to higher educational level of the labour force. And we will be




Gloss: Since the country’s founding, under the leadership of the party and government,
our country’s cause of modernisation construction yielded tremendous achievements.
TT: Since the founding of the People’s Republic of China, under the leadership of our
party and the central government, remarkable achievements have been made in advancing
our modernisation drive.
Chinese government/we as the chief actor (subject/theme position) in
interpreted English discourse
Beyond the interpreters’ general alignment to reinforce Beijing’s institutional hegemony, it
is useful to pinpoint the position where these items appear in sentences/clauses. The SFL
concepts of theme/rheme are relevant here. Themes, as ‘discourse-initiating units’ (Halli-
day, 2004, p. 89), occupy the first position and form the point of departure for clauses,
which are followed and commented on by rhemes. For Halliday (2004), elements in the
thematic position draw more readers/listeners’ attention than elements in the rhematic
position. This is echoed by Baker (2018), who believes that the overall choice and ordering
of themes plays an important part in organising a text and providing a point of orientation
for a given stretch of language. She argues further that the cumulative effect of thematic
choice should not be underestimated in translation. The choice of theme therefore can
be a way of linguistic engineering in interpreting, which is of interest from the perspective
of ideology and discourse. Chinese and English follow a similar SVO (subject + verb +
object) structure, thus making the two languages comparable overall regarding theme/
rheme.
Notably, themes and subjects often have considerable overlap as themes typically are
subjects in both languages (unmarked theme). Exceptions, however, do exist, where
themes are not the subjects (marked theme). An example of this is ‘over the past four
years, this government (subject) has achieved a lot’. Given the nature of the project, the
identification and comparison of what appears in the subject position as the actual
agent or initiator behind the various actions is more relevant and ideologically interesting
than simply what comes first in a sentence or clause. Therefore, attention is focused on the
instances of major self-referential items occupying the subject position here. As such, the
top three self-referential terms in Chinese and English were searched in both subcorpora.
The retrieved concordance lines were further sorted to facilitate the researcher’s obser-
vation. The self-referential items are found to largely assume preeminent positions as
the subjects of sentences/clauses in both subcorpora.
Statistically, 我们 occupies the subject position in the Chinese clauses/sentences 1157
times, out of 1360 mentions of 我们 in the Chinese subcorpus. In comparison, we
assumes the subject position in English 2013 times, out of 2989 instances of the
broader WE (we, us, our*) identified. Similarly, 政府 occupies the subject position 223
times in Chinese, whereas government occupies the subject position 326 times in
English. This same trend is also found in the comparison between中国 and China. There-
fore, self-referential items tend to be rendered significantly more explicit as subjects in
English, thus further foregrounding the Chinese government discursively as the social
actor and agent responsible for various actions in interpreting. This is aptly illustrated
in Example 4, where the Chinese ‘government’ becomes the subject/theme in the
English interpretation (rather than ‘the government’s work’).
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Example 4 (2007)
ST: 政府工作走过了四个年头，它告诉我们必须懂得一个真理…
Gloss: The government’s work has gone through four years. It told us that must under-
stand one truth…
TT: This government has been serving the people for four years. The four years of gov-
ernment work has taught me three things…
This and the interpreter’s employment of the present perfect continuous structure
highlight the vital role of the Chinese government as the chief actor in ‘serving the
people’. This also serves to (re)construct an emphatic people-oriented image of Beijing
in English in front of the international audience. The tendency for self-referential items
to be rendered more prominent and assume the subject/theme position in English is
also visible in the following examples (which also illustrate the general tendency for the
interpreters to add self-referential items as discussed earlier). Notably, the Chinese ST is
sometimes even further strengthened through other discursive means, such as an
upgrade in modality value (example 5).
Example 5 (2016)
ST: 所以简政放权必须一以贯之。哪里遇到问题碰到阻力就要设法去解决。
Gloss: So the streamlining of administration and delegation of power must be consist-
ent. Where problems are met and resistance is encountered, efforts need to be made to
solve them.
TT: We must make persistent efforts to forge ahead with this government reform and
wherever there is an obstacle to this reform, the government must get right on it.
Example 6 (2011)
ST: 而做到所有这一些，都必须推进经济体制改革和政治体制改革。
Gloss: To achieve all these, economic system reform and political system reform must
be pushed forward.
TT: If we are to achieve all these above-mentioned goals, we must pursue economic
restructuring and political restructuring.
In sum, a comparison of the self-referential terms between subcorpus A and B
points to the interpreters’ significantly increased alignment with the Chinese govern-
ment. This is salient discursively on many levels. Firstly, the interpreters’ repeated
additions of self-referential items demonstrate their in-group identity (Van Dijk,
1984) institutionally as part of China’s ruling elite. Going beyond being merely indica-
tive of interpreters’ institutional identity, the perceived tendency also strengthens the
centripetal force and ‘unitary language’ (Beaton, 2007, p. 279) of the specific institution,
leading to increased presence and hegemony of the government overall. It also helps
(re)create an image of the government being an active and committed actor in
charge of China’s day-to-day running in English. This seems salient in our increasingly
mediat(is)ed world, where the English interpretation is often taken for granted and
appears almost verbatim on various platforms (e.g. media and government websites).
As illustrated in Figure 2, the discourse featuring the interpreter’s additions of self-
referential items (evidenced in Example 5) is presented on the website of China’s
English-language newspaper China Daily as a transcript of the 2016 press conference.
This highlights the discursive ramifications of interpreting beyond the immediate press
conference setting.
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Interpreters’ negotiation of self-referentiality from a relational perspective
Having examined the interpreters’ mediation of self-referential items directionally
between the ST and TT, their alignment is now approached from a relational perspective.
This makes it possible to see how China’s official institutional voice is negotiated by the
interpreters, that is, the relative foregrounding and/or backgrounding4 of certain self-
referential items over others through interpreting.
Given the prominence of the first-person plural pronouns (we, our*, us) in the CE-
PolitDisCorp, attention was focused on the relationships between the collective WE and
the premier’s personal voice I, WE and CHINA as well as WE and GOVERNMENT.
Collective WE vis-à-vis personal I
To explore the relational nexus between the government’s collective voice WE and the
Chinese premier’s personal voice I as a result of interpreting, personal pronouns 我们
and 我 were searched in subcorpus A. Similarly, personal pronouns related to WE (we,
our*, us) and I (I, my, mine, me, myself) were searched in subcorpus B. Information
regarding the frequencies of these personal pronouns and the WE/I ratios in both subcor-
pora is presented in Table 3. Statistically, the WE/I ratios for subcorpora A and B are 1.025
and 1.51. That is, for every 1000 mentions of the broader I, there are 1025 and 1510 men-
tions of the broader WE in Chinese and English. This points to a significant (relative) fore-
grounding of the ideological presence of a collective WE in English proportionately at the
expense of the premier’s personal voice. This is achieved through the interpreters’
Figure 2. Screenshot of the interpreter-mediated discourse appearing on China Daily website
Table 3. Broader WE and broader I in both subcorpora
Subcorpus A (Chinese) Subcorpus B (English)
Broader WE 我们 (1360) we 2103; our* 753; us 133 (2989)
Broader I 我 (1327) I 1516; my 245; mine 1; me 181; myself 36 (1979)
WE/I ratio 1.025 1.51
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proportionally stronger alignment with the collective WE (presumably the voice of China
and, by extension, the voice of the Chinese nation and civilisation led by the Communist
party and government).
Collective WE vis-à-vis GOVERNMENT and CHINA
Similarly, the relational links between the collective WE (we, us, our*), GOVERN-
MENT and CHINA (China and Chinese) are discussed here. Firstly, the WE/GOV-
ERNMENT ratios were calculated in both subcorpora. Statistically, the WE/
GOVERNMENT ratios are 3.686 and 5.015 in subcorpus A and B. That is, for 1,000
mentions of GOVERNMENT, there are 3,686 and 5,015 mentions of the broader
WE in Chinese and English respectively. While there is a (dramatically) increased pres-
ence of government in the TT in absolute terms (a 61.5% increase over the ST, which is
in itself significant), the interpreters, comparatively, are more inclined to use we and its
related forms in the TT, hence a relative backgrounding of the more specific notion
‘government’. Similarly, the WE/CHINA ratios were calculated in both subcorpora.
Statistically, the WE/CHINA ratios are 1.663 and 2.118 (for 1,000 mentions of
China/Chinese there are 1,663 and 2,118 mentions of the broader WE in the ST and
TT). As such, while items subsumed under WE and CHINA were both statistically
(over)produced in the TT in absolute terms, the broader CHINA has been compara-
tively backgrounded in interpreting.
While the various lexical items subsumed under the broader WE (we, us, our*)
apparently refer to the government and China, WE is arguably an embodied and
subtle concept in the unique Chinese context. According to the guiding ‘Three Rep-
resents’ Thought that was written into the Constitution, the Communist Party of
China (CPC) must always represent the development trend of China’s advanced pro-
ductive forces, the orientation of China’s advanced culture, and the fundamental inter-
ests of the overwhelming majority of the Chinese people. As such, the broader WE in
the Chinese context represents not just the Communist party, the government, and
China as a political entity but also the entire Chinese nation and civilisation by exten-
sion. Discursively, the first-person plural we and its related forms are more engaging
and evocative in nature than the more specific item government (consider, for
example, ‘yes, we can’, ‘we’ve got it covered’, ‘come fly with us’ in commercial and
political language use).
Rather than dichotomising China, the government and, for instance, the people, the
interpreters’ proliferated use and relative foregrounding of the collective WE (we, us,
our*) foster a sense of ‘collective intentionality’, which represents ‘a sense of doing
(wanting, believing, etc.) something together’ (Searle, 1995, p. 24–25). This strengthened
sense of togetherness highlights the inseparable nature of the will/achievements of the gov-
ernment and the people. Put differently, the relative foregrounding of WE indicates that,
although the Chinese government under the CPC is the predominant social actor, ‘we’ are
together in China’s progress en route to the realisation of its various goals. As such, dis-
cursively and cognitively, the interpreters’ foregrounding of the collective WE has conso-
lidated the leadership of the CPC, thereby strengthening the hegemonic discourse that WE
led by the CPC represents the collective voice of the Chinese people as well as the Chinese
nation and civilisation.
PERSPECTIVES 13
A diachronic analysis of the broader WE across administrations
For a deeper understanding of interpreters’ alignment, the broader WE was investigated
further from a diachronic perspective. The 20 years’ press conference data can be
divided into three administrations: Premier Zhu (1998–2002), Premier Wen (2003–
2012) and Premier Li (2013–2017). In each period, 我们 and its English equivalent WE
(we, our* and us) were searched in both subcorpora. Mentions of the items in each
period were counted and adjusted based on average annual frequency for comparison dia-
chronically (Table 4).
While there is roughly a similar number of 我们 in the ST during each administration
each year (65.4, 64.6 and 77.4 respectively), the interpreters have shown increased align-
ment with the premier’s articulation of the first-person plural 我们in each period (a
50.8%, 151.4% and 125.3% increase respectively). In particular, there is a dramatic
surge in the interpreters’ first-person plural pronoun use in the TT, with premier
Wen’s administration being a pronounced watershed. The sudden spike in interpreters’
alignment witnessed in this administration became relatively stabilised and continued
into his successor, premier Li’s administration.
Interestingly, the analysis by Wu and Zhao (2016) focusing on the aggressiveness of
Chinese premiers’ answers in Chinese also identifies the administration starting from
2003 as an important ‘watershed’. Since 2003, the adversarialness of the premiers’
answers has decreased significantly, which for them might have to do with the Severe
Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) crisis that broke out in China that year. The previous
tendency to downplay negative news and release information inefficiently gave way to a
more transparent and less aggressive approach in government-journalist ties (Liang &
Xue, 2004). This suggests that the Hu-Wen administration adopted a comparatively
more open style of governance featuring active engagement (at least evidenced in these
press conferences). This perceived trend of engagement was further facilitated by the
interpreters through their increased institutional alignment since 2003. As such, the
decrease in adversarialness of the premiers’ answers has, to some extent, been compen-
sated by the interpreters’ more pronounced and active positioning using WE (which
leads to further government hegemony and a sense of togetherness).
Discussion and conclusion
Benefitting from CDA analysis based on a large corpus, this article has investigated the
interpreters’ mediation of self-referentiality from various angles in order to identify the
mechanisms of system reproduction as framed by Luhmann. Although the elements
Table 4. Frequencies of the broader WE across administrations
















Overall 1,360/68 2,989/149.45 119.78%
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central to system reproduction are commonly understood to take the form of institutional
rules and policies, this study shows the significance of considering the conferences as a
performative space and the need for a critical approach to the complex discursive perform-
ances to help index interpreter behaviour and its impact on system reproduction.
In absolute terms, there is markedly increased (re)production of self-referentiality in
English (86.3%). Such active interpreter alignment significantly strengthens the govern-
ment’s ideological presence and institutional hegemony, (re)creating an overall image of
Beijing being responsible and in control cumulatively over the 20 years. Given that in
the Chinese context the Chinese government is the dominant actor and agent responsible
for different aspects of China’s reforms, development and day-to-day running, this leads to
further government legitimacy and (re)constructs a stronger degree of its raison d’être in
front of the global audience.
In addition, an examination of the specific position of the top-three self-referential
items in both subcorpora shows that these items tend to more frequently occupy the
subject position in clauses and sentences in English. As such, the Chinese government
is rendered more prominent as the chief social actor responsible for a range of actions.
Relationally, the broader WE (we, our*, us) proves to be a salient choice adopted by the
government-affiliated interpreters. Proportionately, its frequent use is employed at the
expense of the premier’s personal voice I, and seems to have backgrounded the presence
of GOVERNMENT and CHINA relatively speaking. The frequent use of the first-person
plural we and its related forms indicates the interpreters’ positioning as part of the govern-
ment and helps (re)construct ‘collective intentionality’ (Searle, 1995, pp. 24–25). Further
diachronic investigation of the broader WE demonstrates that the interpreters tend to
actively (re)produce the we-related items in each administration. This, however, is most
pronounced during premier Wen’s administration (2003–2012), a period featuring a
softer approach. To some extent, the sharp drop in the adversarialness and ideological
force of the premier’s answers in this period seems to have been offset by a strengthening
in the government’s institutional hegemony due to the interpreters’ increased alignment.
Admittedly, given the consecutive interpreting mode and the pressure these
interpreters are under, the additions of we and its related forms might be a coping strategy
and a relatively safe option. Further research triangulating performance data with retro-
spective interpreter interviews would support investigation of this aspect and others,
such as the extent to which such strategies constitute conscious explicitation for the
target audience. From a product-oriented perspective, however, the proliferated use and
relative foregrounding of WE (vis-à-vis GOVERNMENT and CHINA) is significant dis-
cursively. This not only indicates the interpreters’ institutional identity but also enhances
the government’s hegemony in English in a less noticeable yet cumulative manner, thereby
reflecting Fairclough’s observation that ideology is often most effective when its workings
are least visible (1989).
Notes
1. Even in cases of anaphoric or inclusive use of ‘we’ (referring, for instance, to China/Chinese
government and a foreign country/government mentioned earlier) the interpreters arguably
are still (partially) aligning themselves with Beijing as representatives of the Department of
Foreign Affairs and China’s ruling elite.
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2. This scenario is different from, for instance, the UK parliamentary debate or debate in the EU
setting as in Beaton-Thome’s (2010) study, in which she identifies that ‘we’ can be used exclu-
sively or inclusively by MEPs to refer to the countries they represent or the EU institution as a
whole.
3. Further analysis illustrates the often interconnected nature of the various self-referential
items, where the first-person plural we and its various forms, government, Communist
Party, China/Chinese are sometimes juxtaposed with each other. This is evidenced in the fol-
lowing appositions (e.g. ‘we as government’ [three times in 2004], ‘we as a nation’ [2005] and
‘we the Chinese nation’ [2007]) and the juxtaposition of various self-referential terms (e.g.
[our] party and [our] country, [our/the] party and [the] [central] government, whole
party and all the Chinese people, our government, Chinese government). The interwoven
and mutually enhancing nature of these items is unsurprising, given the current one-party
rule in mainland China, where the CPC represents both the ruling party, the government
and China.
4. Discussions on foregrounding and backgrounding can be found in Fairclough (1995). In this
corpus-based study, however, foregrounding and backgrounding refer to the frequency shift
of a certain item as a result of interpreting. In other words, if certain items are featured more
(or less) prominently in the TT, they are relatively foregrounded (or backgrounded). This is
of interest from the perspective of the interpreters’ ideological mediation.
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